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In spring 2016, Greece reported an outbreak caused 
by a previously undescribed  Salmonella enter-
ica  subsp.  enterica  serotype (antigenic formula 
11:z41:e,n,z15) via the Epidemic Intelligence 
Information System for Food- and Waterborne 
Diseases and Zoonoses (EPIS-FWD), with epide-
miological evidence for sesame products as pre-
sumptive vehicle. Subsequently, Germany, Czech 
Republic, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (UK) 
reported infections with this novel serotype via EPIS-
FWD. Concerned countries in collaboration with the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC) and European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
adopted a common outbreak case definition. An out-
break case was defined as a laboratory-confirmed 
notification of the novel Salmonella serotype. Between 
March 2016 and April 2017, 47 outbreak cases were 
notified (Greece: n = 22; Germany: n = 13; Czech 
Republic: n = 5; Luxembourg: n = 4; UK: n = 3). Whole 
genome sequencing revealed the very close genetic 
relatedness of isolates from all affected countries. 
Interviews focusing on sesame product consumption, 
suspicious food item testing and trace-back analysis 
following  Salmonella  spp. detection in food products 
identified a company in Greece where sesame seeds 
from different countries were processed. Through 
European collaboration, it was possible to identify and 
recall sesame spread as one contaminated food item 
serving as vehicle of infection and trace it back to its 
origin.
Background
Salmonella spp. is responsible for the majority of food-
borne outbreaks in Europe [1]. Between 15 March and 
30 May 2016, the Greek National Reference Laboratory 
for Salmonella and Shigella (NRLSS) in Vari, a suburb of 
Athens, detected 16  Salmonella enterica  subsp.  enter-
ica  isolates with the antigenic formula 11:z41:e,n,z15 
sharing an indistinguishable PFGE profile. This combi-
nation of antigens is not listed in the current ninth edi-
tion of the White-Kauffman–Le Minor scheme [2,3]. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre 
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for Reference and Research on  Salmonella  at Institut 
Pasteur in Paris, France, confirmed the antigenic pro-
file 11:z41:e,n,z15 as a novel  Salmonella  serotype 
[4]. The proposed name of the novel serotype 
is Salmonella Vari.
Initial epidemiological investigations did not reveal 
any apparent link between the cases [4]. First cases 
had disease onset in March 2016, around the begin-
ning of the Lent season of Orthodox Easter when vari-
ous sesame products are traditionally served. Results 
of a case–case study provided evidence for tahini, a 
paste made from hulled, ground and toasted sesame 
seeds, being the most probable vehicle of infection in 
Greece. However, it was not possible to identify a sin-
gle product trademark or a single place of purchase 
of the tahini. No food isolate had been recovered for 
testing.
Multi-country outbreak detection
An urgent inquiry (UI-358) was launched by Greece in 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC)’s Epidemic Intelligence Information System for 
Food- and Waterborne Diseases and Zoonoses (EPIS-
FWD) [5] on 10 May 2016 to ask if other countries also 
detected this novel serotype. Between May 2016 and 
April 2017, Germany, Czech Republic, Luxembourg and 
the United Kingdom (UK) also reported salmonellosis 
cases infected with the novel serotype through EPIS-
FWD. ECDC called for a multi-country investigation and 
formed an outbreak investigation team comprised of 
experts from public health institutes at national and 
European levels. National- and European-level food 
safety agencies were also involved in the outbreak 
investigation.
Here we describe how the outbreak investigation was 
conducted and what it unveiled. We also address what 
control measures were put in place in response to the 
outbreak.
Methods
Epidemiological investigation and sampling of 
food samples
Case definition
The multi-country outbreak investigation team decided 
on a common outbreak case definition. Outbreak cases 
were defined as laboratory-confirmed notifications 
of  Salmonella enterica  subspecies  enterica  with the 
antigenic formula 11:z41:e,n,z15 (or corresponding in 
silico serotype/multilocus sequence type retrieved 
from whole genome sequencing (WGS) data) between 
1 March 2016 and 30 April 2017.
Cases were interviewed using national questionnaires. 
The questionnaires included questions on travel to 
Greece or visits from relatives or friends from Greece, 
and sesame consumption in the week before disease 
onset.
Food samples
Sesame products mentioned in more than one inter-
view were, when available from cases’ households, 
sampled by the responsible food and veterinary 
authorities and analysed for  Salmonella. Additionally, 
official control samples from the retail shops where 
the cases had bought these products were taken and 
analysed in official control laboratories. As part of the 
outbreak investigation, staff from the German Federal 
Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) and the Robert Koch 
Institute (RKI), both in Berlin, Germany, purchased food 
items of the same type from a German online shop or 
in retail shops in Berlin without direct connection to 
the cases. These unofficial samples were directly sent 
Table 1
Description of salmonellosis outbreak cases with novel Salmonella enterica subspecies enterica serotype (11:z41:e,n,z15), five 
European countries, 1 March 2016–30 April 2017 (n = 47)a







Number of asymptomatic cases/
cases with information on symptoms 
available
Greece 22 8 3 0–62 1/19
Germany 13 9 30 2–75 1/11
Czech Republic 5 3 3 0–41 NA
Luxembourg 4 3 51 31–59 3/4
United Kingdom 3 3 61 6–70 NA
Total 47 26 8 0–75 5/34
NA: no information available.
a In the aftermath of the outbreak investigation, seven additional infections with the novel serotype were notified between 1 May and 30 
September 2017 (France: n = 2; Greece: n = 2; Germany: n = 1; Luxembourg: n = 1; Serbia: n = 1).
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to the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) at BfR and 
analysed for Salmonella.
Detection of the novel  Salmonella  serotype in food 
taken as part of companies’ own routine checks 
(samples taken by the food business operator to ensure 
compliance with food safety requirements) or official 
routine control samples was communicated among the 
outbreak team.
Microbiology and whole genome sequencing 
analysis
All  Salmonella enterica  subspecies  enterica  serotype 
11:z41:e,n,z15 human isolates from Greece, Germany, 
Czech Republic, Luxembourg and the UK underwent 
phenotypic serotyping by slide agglutination [2,3]. The 
serotype of the UK isolates was also confirmed by in 
silico serotyping based on WGS data with SeqSero ver-
sion 1 [6]. Since this particular antigenic formula had not 
been listed in the White-Kauffman-Le Minor scheme, 
one respective strain from Greece was sent to the 
WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research 
on Salmonella at Institut Pasteur for confirmation.
The food items sampled in Germany were tested 
for  Salmonella  spp. according to ISO 6579:2002/Amd 
1:2007 [7]. For the enumeration of  Salmonella  in the 
food samples, the direct plating method was performed 
by spread plating 0.1 ml and 1 ml of each sample from 
the 1:10 dilution in triplicates onto XLD agar plates, 
respectively.
ECDC initiated WGS for isolates from Greece, Germany, 
Czech Republic and Luxembourg to assess their rela-
tionship. Public Health England (PHE) performed WGS 
of the UK strains. Paired-end, short-read sequencing 
via MiSeq or HiSeq (Illumina, San Diego, California, 
United States) was performed either by a commercial 
provider that was coordinated and funded by ECDC, 
or by the public health institutes of the countries 
themselves.
Table 2
Overview of food specimens that tested positive for the novel Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica serotype (11:z41:e,n,z15), 
Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, 21 March 2016–4 May 2017














540 bags of 
sesame seeds 
(each bag = 
22.68 kg)
Nigeria RASFF 2017.0221 14 December 2016
2 Germany Sesame spreadb
Household of 
case 21 March 2017 Sealed jar Sudan
RASFF 
2017.0408 5 April 2017
3 Germany Sesame spreadb Retail shop
c 21 March 2017 Sealed jar Sudan RASFF 2017.0408 5 April 2017
4 Germany Sesame spreada,b Online shop 24 March 2017 Sealed jar Sudan Not mentioned 29 March 2017
5 Germany Sesame spreadb Online shop 24 March 2017 Sealed jar Sudan Not mentioned 29 March 2017
6 Germany Sesame spreadb Online shop 24 March 2017 Sealed jar Sudan Not mentioned 29 March 2017
7 Germany Sesame spreadb
Retail shop 
(Berlin) 22 March 2017 Sealed jar Sudan Not mentioned NA
8 Germany Sesame spreadb
Retail shop 
(Berlin) 23 March 2017 Sealed jar Sudan Not mentioned NA
9 Germany Sesame spreadb
Household of 
case 4 May 2017 Opened jar Sudan Not mentioned 17 May 2017




















NA: no information available; RASFF: Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed.
a Included in whole genome sequencing (WGS) analysis.
b All from the same lot.
c Reference sample for Number 2. Sample was purchased from the same retail shop that Number 2 purchased the product from.
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The National Reference Centre for Salmonella and 
Other Bacterial Enteric Pathogens at RKI conducted the 
multi-country sequence analysis. Raw reads (Germany) 
or assembled genomes (Luxembourg) were provided 
by the individual partners or by ECDC (Greece and 
Czech Republic). Raw reads from the UK strains were 
downloaded from the Sequence Read Archive (SRA), 
respectively. The seven-locus multilocus sequence 
typing (MLST) based on whole genome data according 
to the scheme of Achtman et al. [8], as well as gene-
by-gene comparison, were conducted using Ridom 
SeqSphere+ version 5.1.0_(2018-06) [9]. Sequence data 
were processed using the programme’s default set-
tings for quality control and allele calling. Raw reads 
were de novo assembled by the implemented assem-
bly algorithm (Velvet version 1.1.04). The applied ad 
hoc core genome (cg)MLST scheme for  Salmonella 
enterica  established at RKI comprises 2,143 core 
genome loci [10]. Genomes of 24 human isolates from 
Greece, Germany, Czech Republic, Luxembourg and 
the UK, as well as sequences from four food isolates 
from Germany, Luxembourg and the UK were analysed 
with this scheme. For cgMLST analysis, a minimum of 
95% good targets was required. Sequence reads from 
German and UK isolates, both from humans and food, 
are available under the European Nucleotide Archive 
(ENA)/National Center for Biotechnology Information 
(NCBI) accession numbers PRJEB27505 (ERS2589577–
ERS2589590) and PRJNA248792 (SRR5413117–
SRR5413122), respectively. Sequence data from the 
Luxembourgish human strains and from one exemplary 
human strain from Greece are available on Enterobase 
[11].
Trace-back investigations
When Salmonella spp. was detected in food, trace-back 
investigations were initiated. Information about the 
implicated food sources reported via the Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed (RASFF) was used by the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to perform the 
food traceability investigation at the European Union 
(EU) level. Companies identified by trace-back analysis 
were visited by the respective competent authorities 
who assessed production procedures and hygiene.
Results
Epidemiological investigation
Applying the joint outbreak case definition, 47 out-
break cases were notified between 1 March 2016 and 
30 April 2017 (Greece: n = 22; Germany: n = 13; Czech 
Republic: n = 5; Luxembourg: n = 4; UK n = 3) (Table 1). 
Five of 34 cases with clinical information available were 
asymptomatic. Of 26 cases with information available 
on hospitalisation, 12 were hospitalised [12].
Based on the findings of the investigations in Greece, 
interviews in Germany and Luxembourg focused on the 
consumption of sesame products. In Germany, nine 
of 13 cases were exposed within the country. Of the 
nine, five agreed to detailed interviews conducted by 
RKI between February and May 2017. In Luxembourg, 
all four cases were interviewed. In total, seven of nine 
interviewed patients (5/5 from Germany; 2/4 from 
Luxembourg) reported consuming a particular brand of 
sweet sesame spread.
In the aftermath of the outbreak investigation, seven 
additional infections with the novel serotype were noti-
fied between 1 May and 30 September 2017 (France: n 
= 2; Greece: n = 2; Germany: n = 1; Luxembourg: n = 1; 
Serbia: n = 1).
Food testing
In March 2016, sushi containing sesame seeds tested 
positive for  Salmonella  enterica  subspecies  enter-
ica  serotype 11:z41:e,n,z15 (which was at that time, 
designated as ‘Salmonella unnamed’) via a company’s 
own check at a private testing laboratory in the UK, 
but follow-up testing did not identify Salmonella in the 
constituent ingredients (Table 2). This finding was com-
municated in response to the Early Warning Response 
System (EWRS) notification on the publication of the 
ECDC Rapid Risk Assessment in March 2017 [12].
In December 2016, one delivery of sesame seeds from 
Greece to Germany tested positive for  Salmonella 
enterica  serotype 11:z41:e,n,z15 during a company’s 
own routine check in Germany. The company rou-
tinely examines every new batch of sesame seeds 
delivered to their facilities before using them in food 
production. The whole contaminated batch was sent 
back to the distributing company in Greece. The find-
ings were communicated via RASFF 2017.0221 [13]. 
The  Salmonella  isolate was sent for serotyping to the 
Institute for Hygiene and Environment in Hamburg and 
from there, the results were forwarded to RKI.
Official samples were taken in households of two 
German cases: one was taken in March 2017 from the 
household of a school aged child and one in May 2017 
from a person in their 60s. One of these two jars was 
still sealed. A reference sample was taken from the 
retail shop where the jar was purchased from.
Another three jars were ordered online by BfR and 
an additional two jars were bought at retail shops in 
Berlin by RKI.
In total, eight jars of the sesame spread were collected 
in Germany. In Luxembourg, one jar was bought from 
a retail shop. All nine jars were from the same lot, the 
only one on the market at that time, and  Salmonella 
enterica  subsp.  enterica  serotype (antigenic formula 
11:z41:e,n,z15) could be recovered from each of them. 
Of the eight sealed jars, three were used to quan-
tify  Salmonella  spp.. The number of  Salmonella  spp. 
determined by direct plating ranged from 77 to 160 
colony forming units (cfu)/g sesame spread in three 
unopened jars. Results were communicated via RASFF 
2017.0408 [14].
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Microbiology and whole genome sequencing 
analysis
Whole genome sequences from 24 human isolates 
(Germany: n = 12; Czech Republic: n =3; Greece: n = 
3; Luxembourg: n = 3; UK: n =3) and four food isolates 
(sesame spread: n =2; sesame seeds: n =1; sushi: n 
=1) were analysed. The average per-base coverage 
(assembled) ranged from 27- to 116-fold (median 60.5-
fold) for the 28 WGS datasets. All samples belonged to 
seven-locus sequence type ST2914. For gene-by-gene 
comparison by cgMLST applying the RKI ad hoc scheme 
based on 2,143 cg-loci, a minimum of 95% good targets 
was required. The median percentage of good targets 
was 99.8 (Supplementary Table S1). CgMLST revealed 
one distinct cluster with a maximum pairwise distance 
of 2 cgMLST alleles between any two isolates (Figure 1). 
Trace-back and trace-forward investigations
The sesame spread positive for  Salmonella enter-
ica  subsp.  enterica  (antigenic formula 11:z41:e,n,z15) 
had a best before date of 1 February 2018 and was 
produced in Greece by company A with sesame seeds 
originating from Sudan. These seeds were harvested in 
Sudan in June 2015, arriving at company A in Greece in 
November 2015. Tahini from these seeds was produced 
on 18 March 2016. It was stored in plastic pallet tanks 
until 21 March 2016 when part of it was mixed with the 
other sesame spread ingredients: sugar, cottonseed 
oil and soya lecithin. The resulting spread was pumped 
through a closed pipeline system into a stainless steel 
holding tank at ca 45 °C. The product was filled into 
glass jars on 3 consecutive days, 21 to 23 March 2016. 
The jars had undergone ultraviolet (UV) treatment 
before filling (without the caps, RASFF 2017.0408-
fup15 [14]). The remaining sesame seeds from the lot 
from Sudan were used for the production of sesame 
oil, and hulled as well as natural roasted seeds.
Trace-forward investigations showed that the ses-
ame spread had been delivered to Germany in March 
2016 and was distributed to other countries from 
there: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Switzerland. The spread was available to 
consumers in special health food stores and via online 
shops since March 2016.
It has not been possible to demonstrate a link between 
human cases occurring in Czech Republic, Greece, 
Serbia and the UK and the distribution of the ses-
ame spread. Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Portugal and 
Switzerland did not report human cases with this novel 
serotype even though the same lot of sesame spread 
that tested positive was distributed there. The sesame 
spread had also been imported into France and there, 
the novel serotype was detected in two patients follow-
ing the defined outbreak period and after the product 
recall.
The sesame seeds that tested positive in Germany in 
December 2016 originated from Nigeria where they had 
been harvested in January 2016. In September 2016, 
the seeds arrived at company A in Greece, the same 
company where the sesame spread had been produced 
6 months earlier. After processing, the seeds were 
shipped to a company in Germany via seven deliver-
ies, all of which were part of the same lot. One of these 
deliveries tested positive for the novel serotype dur-
ing a company’s own routine check. Investigations by 
German food safety authorities revealed that all seeds 
from this delivery were directly sent back to Greece 
where they were safeguarded by the Greek authori-
ties. Thus, the seeds of that particular delivery never 
reached the consumer and could not explain any of 
the cases. The remaining six deliveries originating 
from the same lot harvested in Nigeria tested nega-
tive for  Salmonella  spp. and were further distributed. 
For these, trace-forward investigations were not 
undertaken.
The results of the tracing investigations are visualised 
in Figure 2. 
Trace-back investigations of the sushi that tested 
positive for  Salmonella enterica  subspecies  enter-
ica serotype (antigenic formula 11:z41:e,n,z15) in March 
2016 were not carried out in the UK as Salmonella spp. 
was not isolated from any of the 24 constituent 
ingredients, including three types of sesame seeds. 
During subsequent attempts to carry out trace-back 
investigations in 2017, the source of the sesame seeds 
could not be established.
Figure 1
Minimum spanning tree showing genetic relatedness 
within the novel Salmonella enterica subsp. enterica 















a Sesame spread, sesame seeds and sushi containing sesame.
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Investigations at company A in Greece
The only identified link between the contaminated ses-
ame seeds from Nigeria that were tested in Germany 
and the sesame spread produced from Sudanese 
sesame seeds was company A in Greece, a large ses-
ame seed-processing company that distributes seeds 
and products to various European countries. The 
Greek authority for food safety visited this company 
in order to assess the manufacturing processes and 
hygiene conditions, and to identify possible critical 
points for cross-contamination. All company A’s checks 
for Salmonella spp. remained negative.
Sesame seeds delivered to company A in Greece 
undergo the following processing steps before they are 
directly sold or used as an ingredient in sesame prod-
ucts (RASFF 2017.0221-fup06 [13]): (i) removal of impu-
rities, e.g. stones, dust and plant material, through 
sieving or other techniques; (ii) washing to remove soil 
and dust residues; (iii) mechanical hulling to remove 
the outer skin of the sesame seeds (only relevant for 
hulled type of sesame seeds); (iv) drying at a minimum 
of 90 °C, typically 100–105 °C, for 10 min; and (v) steri-
lising in a sterilisation tower where culinary steam is 
applied inside a closed spiral tube.
The production line in company A is usually closed. 
However, during production of the lot of sesame spread 
that tested positive, the production line was inter-
rupted by an intermediate storage step of the tahini 
used in the spread. Before the tahini was mixed with 
the other ingredients of the spread, it was held for 3 
days in plastic pallet tanks without documentation of 
adequate sanitation and appropriate storage condi-
tions. Since July 2016, the mixers have been fed with 
tahini directly from the pasteuriser through a closed 
pipeline system, or if there is need for intermediate 
storage, stainless steel tanks sanitized by a validated 
sanitation procedure are used (RASFF 2017.0408-fup16 
[14]). The Nigerian sesame seeds were processed in 
September 2016 in company A when the plastic pallet 
tanks were no longer in use.
Figure 2
Results of trace-back investigations of sesame spread and Nigerian sesame seeds testing positive for the novel Salmonella 
enterica subspecies enterica serotype (11:z41:e,n,z15)a in relation to outbreak cases with known disease onset or date of 




























Storage and processing at


















a Three food items tested positive for the novel serotype, but only the two with trace-back investigations are reflected in the figure: 
the sesame spread produced of sesame seeds originating from Sudan and the sesame seeds from Nigeria. There was no trace-back 
investigation for the third item, the sushi in the United Kingdom for reasons explained in the manuscript.
b Of the 47 outbreak cases, three did not have information regarding disease onset or date of receipt of the isolate at the reference laboratory.
c No known cases during the time of the outbreak.
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Outbreak control measures
Through interviews of patients in Germany and 
Luxembourg, a special brand of sesame spread was 
identified as the probable vehicle of infection, at least 
in these two countries. The results of the interviews 
lead to testing of the product. After the sesame spread 
tested positive for Salmonella spp. on 28 March 2017, it 
was recalled from the market at the end of March 2017. 
Consumers were informed of the recall by written notice 
in shops that sold the product or by press release. 
Trace-back investigations of the sesame spread, and 
of sesame seeds from Nigeria that also tested positive 
for the novel serotype, identified a company in Greece 
as the only similarity. This led to an inspection of the 
production line of sesame products at the company.
Discussion
Many reports describe salmonellosis outbreaks 
associated with sesame products involving various 
diverse serotypes [15-18]. Contamination of sesame 
seeds or products thereof with Salmonella spp. seems 
to occur regularly. With regards to the detection 
of  Salmonella  spp. in sesame, 569 notifications have 
been submitted to RASFF as of 19 August 2019. In 
addition to notification 2017.0408, which pertains to 
this investigation, 18 notifications of  Salmonella  spp. 
in sesame paste, tahini or helva have been sub-
mitted to the RASFF portal. The frequent detection 
of  Salmonella  in sesame products recently motivated 
studies addressing the survival of Salmonella in tahini 
[19-21], and controls during the production process 
have been recommended [16]. Possible reasons for 
contamination, e.g. faecal contamination of irrigation 
water, need further investigation.
We described a salmonellosis outbreak with 47 
confirmed cases across five European countries 
between March 2016 and April 2017 involving a 
novel Salmonella serotype. The outbreak investigation 
identified sesame seed products as the vehicle of 
infection, leading to the recall of a sesame spread and 
an EU-wide food-chain analysis that suggested cross-
contamination between different sesame seed lots in a 
large sesame seed processing company.
There are several factors that contributed to the suc-
cess of this outbreak investigation. One, the timely 
EPIS-FWD notification by Greece underlines the value 
of international alerts. The outbreak comprised only 
47 cases and the temporal and geographical spread 
of cases outside of Greece resembled that of sporadic 
cases, which would have made it difficult to detect the 
outbreak.
Two, the detection of this outbreak was facilitated 
by the fact that the causative agent was a novel 
serotype. The same outbreak pattern with a com-
mon  Salmonella  serotype, e.g.  S. Enteritidis, would 
probably have been detected much later or not at all 
without high-discrimination typing data. Although the 
temporally-related occurrence of  Salmonella  isolates 
of the novel serotype together with the results of the 
epidemiological studies strongly indicated a direct 
link between the cases from different countries, the 
close genetic relatedness of the strains was further 
confirmed by WGS. This provided important evidence 
for the comparison of the human strains from different 
countries and the food isolates.
Three, the rapid sharing of epidemiological informa-
tion across public health and food safety authori-
ties allowed for timely responses. The results of the 
case–case study conducted in Greece were communi-
cated early and enabled focused interviews of cases 
in Germany and Luxembourg. These interviews were 
pivotal in identifying the sesame spread as one pos-
sible outbreak vehicle. This information was directly 
forwarded to food safety authorities who collected 
samples of the spread, of which were all from the same 
lot, the only one available at the time, and tested posi-
tive for the novel serotype. The product was conse-
quently recalled from the market.
Four, the positive testing of the food specimens played 
an important role in supporting the epidemiological 
evidence. However, taking samples in cases´ house-
holds is often not possible or can be realised only 
with a certain delay. In this case, the long-shelf-life 
of the product enabled the sampling in cases’ house-
holds. For other products, such as eggs, this is often 
not possible. The analysis of unofficial samples, those 
purchased from retail in this investigation and not 
taken directly by food safety authorities, also provided 
valuable information. Based on this, countries should 
be encouraged to also share the results of unofficial 
samples through the appropriate official channel, i.e. 
RASFF.
Five, it was a lucky coincidence that 
the Salmonella isolate detected in the Nigerian sesame 
seeds during a company’s own routine check in 
Germany was serotyped. This is often not the case for 
food isolates, making it difficult to compare findings 
from human and food investigations.
Six, the trace-back investigations of the sesame spread 
made of Sudanese sesame seeds and trace-back inves-
tigations of the Nigerian sesame seeds provided strong 
hints that cross-contamination at company A in Greece 
was possibly behind this prolonged and European-
wide salmonellosis outbreak. A detailed analysis of the 
production line at company A in Greece in the future 
could lead to better understanding in assessing criti-
cal control points and appropriate measures during the 
sesame seed processing steps.
Seven, as a consequence of this outbreak investiga-
tion, the European Commission included sesame seeds 
from Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda, the latter because of 
another RASFF alert regarding  Salmonella  in sesame 
seeds during that time, to the list of feed and food 
of non-animal origin subject to an increased level 
8 www.eurosurveillance.org
of official controls on imports because of possible   
Salmonella  contamination (EU Regulation 2017/1142, 
effective from 1 July 2017 [22]).
Some questions remain. One, it remains unclear how 
cross-contamination between the sesame spread and 
the Nigerian sesame seeds was possible at company 
A and why sterilisation of the seeds was not effective 
in preventing salmonellosis infections. Processing of 
the Sudanese seeds at company A in Greece took place 
in March 2016. The Nigerian seeds did not arrive at 
the same company until 6 months later, in September 
2016. All sesame seeds are normally washed and 
heated to more than 90 °C. The only identified irregu-
larity in company A was the use of plastic pallet tanks 
in March 2016 for which adequate sanitation was not 
documented. However, these plastic pallet tanks were 
only used up to June 2016. Therefore, these plastic pal-
let tanks most likely did not play a role in the outbreak. 
Neither identifying the reason for the cross-contamina-
tion nor the source of contamination (e.g. contaminated 
irrigation water during the sesame seed production) 
makes recommending how to avoid both in the future 
difficult. Whether the initial contamination occurred 
in Sudan or in another country is impossible to recon-
struct on the basis of the available information. There 
is no information suggesting that the Sudanese seeds 
were the source of the outbreak. It is possible that the 
Sudanese seeds were contaminated within company 
A. No information was available on the origin of the 
sesame seeds used in the sushi product, which may 
have been useful in terms of identifying the source of 
contamination.
The detection of the novel serotype in sushi in the UK 
was communicated in response to the communication 
via the statutory EWRS notification system, which was 
11 months after the urgent inquiry in EPIS had been 
launched. At the time, Public Health England (PHE) 
used the nomenclature ‘Salmonella unnamed’ for novel 
serotypes not yet listed under the White-Kauffmann-Le 
Minor scheme. This caused a delay in the discovery of 
the link between the sushi isolate and the outbreak.
After conclusion of the outbreak investigation and the 
recall of the sesame spread, seven more infections with 
the novel serotype were detected between May and 
September 2017. Of these, four were in countries where 
the sesame spread had been distributed and then 
recalled (France: n = 2; Germany: n = 1; Luxembourg: n 
= 1). Possible explanations are that the patients bought 
the product before the recall at the end of March 2017 
and that this long-shelf-life food was still available in 
their households.
Also, the recall only covered the sesame spread which 
is likely to not have been the only contaminated prod-
uct. If cross-contamination between different sesame 
seed lots was possible at company A, other products 
produced there could theoretically have been fur-
ther vehicles of infection. This might also explain the 
cases and infections in countries where the spread 
was not distributed: Greece (22 cases, 2 infections in 
the aftermath); Czech Republic (5 cases); UK (3 cases); 
and Serbia (1 infection in the aftermath). It might also 
explain the finding in sushi with light toasted sesame 
seeds and black sesame seeds. Unfortunately, we do 
not know which other products may have played a role 
as vehicles of infection during this outbreak beside 
the implicated sesame spread and possibly tahini in 
Greece.
Lessons learned
There are several factors which could be improved in 
order to prevent sesame-borne outbreaks in the future. 
Therefore we would suggest: (i) to carry out further 
investigations regarding the contamination of sesame 
seeds and products thereof in order to identify primary 
contamination sources; (ii) to assess possible places 
of and conditions for cross-contamination; (iii) to initi-
ate trace-forward investigations on all products made 
from a contaminated batch of sesame seeds; and (iv) 
to share all types of information (i.e. from official and 
unofficial sampling as well as typing results) avail-
able on the suspected food through the appropriate 
channel/system.
This outbreak underlines the importance of an inter-
national and cross-sectoral outbreak investigation to 
identify the causative food vehicle enabling its recall 
as well as an EU-wide food-chain analysis with the 
aim to disentangle the origin of the contamination and 
to raise the awareness of the European Commission 
resulting in the implementation of risk management 
measures.
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